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B. E. Hickerson; Chaplain, E. C. Robertson, and Sergeant at Arms, J.
M. Robinson. Hon. George R. Smith, of the Lexington Bar, ex-member
of the club, addressed the society on the future of the Democratic
Party in the State and Nation. Ex-President D. L. McNeill delivered
a farewell address which was much appreciated by the society.
-o-

COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS OF COURT
OF APPEALS.
H. M. BOSWORTH, Auditor

Appellant

VS.
STATE UNIVERSITY, &c.

Appellees

There was involved in this case the constitutionality of an Act of
the Legislature commonly called the Pure Food Act, which had been
on the Statute book for some seventeen years, and which had been
enforced without question during all that time by all the officers of the
Commonwealth having a duty connected therewith. It seems to us
that the opinion of the court is entirely erroneous, and we believe it is
in direct conflict with all the authorities whether in this State or out
of it, involving the particular question upon which the judgment in
this case is made to turn.
We shall not occupy, in this review, the position of carping critic
either upon the learning or the high sense of justice of the Court of
Appeal of Kentucky, for we recognize that it is very much more
important that the people of Kentucky should give due reverence and
respect to the adjudications of the highest court of the Commonwealth,
than that any particular case should be decided right. We shall
undertake to review the opinion in this case in this spirit; the spirit of
being helpful to the Court and with the hope that at some other time,
it will see its way clear to come back to the old, well established and
beaten path of constitutional law, bearing upon the point herein
involved.
The Act was held unconstitutional as being in violation of
Section 51 of the Constitution, which is as follows:

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to
more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.
Section II of the Pure Food Act is the one held unconstitutional,
it being said there is nothing in the title of the Act which authorizes
the payment of money to the Experiment Station for doing the work
which the Act requires its officers to perform. In other words, it is
said that Section II is not germane to the title. The Pure Food Bill
is an elaborate piece of sanitary legislation having a good many
sections. The title of the Act and Section II are as follows:
AN ACT for preventing the manufacture and sale of adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, medicines and liquors, and
providing penalties for violation thereof.
Section Eleven. "Said Experiment Station shall receive
seven dollars and fifty cents ($7.50) for the analysis or examination of any sample of food or drug taken or submitted in
accordance with this Act, and expenses for procuring samples of
food and drugs and in making inspections into the conditions of
and wholesomeness and purity of the food produced, manufactured
or sold in food factories, grocery stores, bakeries, slaughtering
houses, dairies, milk depots or creameries, and all other places
where foods are produced, prepared, stored, kept or offered for
sale; for studying the problems connected with the production,
preparation and sale of foods; for expert witnesses attending
grand juries and courts; clerk hire and all other expenses necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Act. Provided, The
total expenses from all sources shall not exceed in any one year
thirty thousand dollars ($3o,ooo.oo)."
If Section ii is in violation of Section 51 of the Constitution, it is
because it is foreign to the title. If it is foreign, then it could not
have been expressed in the title without coming within the inhibition
of the Constitution against duplicity in the title. There must not be
duplicity of subjects in the title any more than in the body of the Act.
Indeed, this Court has often held that if two subjects are placed in the
title, the whole act is void, whereas when two subjects are placed in the
body of the Act, that one only is void which does not conform to the
title. So then by the logic of the opinion, there was no way by
which the General Assembly could have provided the means for enforcing the Act (i. e. money) without passing two acts, one prescribing the
work to be done and the other providing the money to pay for the
work when done.
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Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 172,
thus states the rule:
"The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished
when a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by
its title. To require every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishment of this general object, to be provided for
by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible."
In the case of Klein vs. Kinkead (Pacific States Reports, vol. 36,
p. 194), involved the, construction of an Act of the State "of Nevada,
entitled "And Act to provide for the taking care of the insane of
Nevada," the body of the Act authorized the taking of money for
this purpose out of the school fund. The Supreme Court of Nevada
thus propounded the rule now under consideration:
"We are unable to find anything in the Act under consideration that does not relate to the care of the insane. The general
subject of the Act includes, not only the construction of an
asylum, but necessarily the means by which the work is to be
accomplished, and the proceedings necessary to be adopted for
the purpose of defraying the expense to be incurred. Certainly no
one interested in the Act would fail to comprehend from its letter
that it contemplated" the expenditure of money, for the care of the
insane necessarily involves such expenditure.
"The Legislature is the sole judge of the mode by which this
money shall be provided, and was equally authorized to raise it by
loan or appropriate it from the general revenues. The Act has
but one subject and that is the care of the insane. All of its
provisions have this common object in view. The different steps
by which the result- is to be accomplished are not aifferent subjects, but minor parts of the same general subject, and legislation
would be impossible if all of these details were required to be
provided for by distinct enactments."
The case of Collins vs. Henderson, ii Bush, 74, is in principle
very similar to the case at bar. Collins procured the passage of an
Act, entitled
"An Act directing the purchase of Collins' Historical Sketches of
Kentusky."
The body of the Act provided for the purchase out of the school
fund; the objection. was made in the litigation arising between the
Historian and the Superintendent of Public Instruction that the
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provision for the purchase with school funds was not germane to the
title of the act.
Oh this subject the Court of Appeals said:
"The Act relates to a single subject and that is clearly
expressed in the title. The particular manner in which the object
of an act is to be accomplished need not, and indeed cannot be
expressed in the title. * * * * The Act directs the purchase
of a book and that subject is sufficiently expressed in the title,
and to designate the fund out of which it was to be paid for, was
directly connected with that subject.
The Act was, however, held unconstitutional for a different reason.
We come now to the great leading case of Phillips vs. The Covington Bridge Co., 2 Metcalf, 219:
The Act in that case was entitled:
"An Act to amend the charter of the Covington and Cincinnati
Bridge Company." The body of the Act not only gave the Bridge Co.
the right to sell stock, but it gave the City of Covington the right to
purchase one hundred thousand dollars of the stock so authorized to
be sold.
In the litigation which arose out of this Act, it was urged that
so much of the Act as authorized the subscription by the city was not
germane to the title, and therefore void. Now the city was not mentioned in the title, and it was admitted in the opinion that it obtained
all of its authority to make the purchase by the Act amending the
charter of the Bridge Company, the Court said:
"The power to sell stock to the city necessarily requires that
a power should be conferred on the latter to subscribe and pay for
it, for without such power, the power to sell would be nugatory.
The subject is the same, although it relates to a transaction to
which two corporations are parties, one of whom only is named in
the title of the Act. * * * * * It was certainly not necesfor the Legislature to pass two separate acts to effect the object
it had in view; one to enable the company to sell the stock to the
city, and another to enable the city to subscribe and pay for it.
"The constitutional provision relied upon must receive a
rational construction, and not one that would lead to such an
unnecessary and absurd result."
Now this case has been cited with approval more times than any
other on the same subject with which I am acquainted. See how
much closer it comes to the very verge of the inhibition of section 51
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than our case. The Act was simply "An Act to amend the charter
of the Bridge Co." Way -down in the body of it was a provision
authorizing the theretofore unnamed city to subscribe for and purchase one hundred thousand dollars of the stock of the Bridge Co.
Under the principle laid down by the Court every city and town in
the State could have been authorized to subscribe for the stock. Who
looking at the title of the Bridge Co. alone would have been warranted in supposing such a power was contained in the body of the
Act? Yet this case is the leading case on the subject of which it treats.
In Johnson & Co. vs. The City of Fulton, 2Ist Ky., 594. The
title of the Act was:
"An Act to regulate the holding of Circuit Courts in counties
in which there are towns over seventeen miles from the county
seat and having a larger population than the County Seat."
There are several sections of the Act; one of which provides that
the larger city should pay the expenses of establishing the new Court.
For the city of Fulton it was urged that section 3, which contained
the provision as to payment of charges, etc., was not embraced in the
title and therefore void. This Court however said:
"The subject expressed in the title of the Act is the holding
of Circuit Courts in counties in which there are towns more than
seventeen miles from the county seat having a larger population
than county seat. Everything in the Act relates to this subject.
The expense of holding the Court is germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act."
We submit that the case at bar cannot be distinguished from the
last cited case; our title is
"An Act for preventing the manufacture and sale of misbranded foods, drugs, medicines and liquors, &c."
The expense of doing this is germane to the title of the Act.
Our title is more comprehensive than that in the citation. "Preventing"
is a very positive word; to prevent the manufacture and sale of misbranded foods, &c., involves detective work and inspection, analysis
and prosecutions; all of this necessarily means the expenditure of
money, and he who read our title was bound to know that the act
called for money to make it effective. If the expense of establishing
the Court was germane to a title "regulating" the holding of courts,
&c., the expense of preventing fraud in the sale of foods is germane
to the title of the pure food act.
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We conclude the citation of authorities by quoting from the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, cited in a note in Lewis'
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. i, p. 222:
"Courts always give a liberal, and not a hypercritical determination to this restriction. All matters are properly included in
the act which are germane to the title. The Constitution is obeyed,
if all the provisions be related to the one subject indicated in the
title, and are parts of it, or incident to it, or reasonably connected
with it, or in some reasonable sense auxiliary to the object in
view. It is not required that the subject of the bill shall be
specifically and exactly expressed in the title, or that the title
should be an index of the details of the act. When there is doubt
as to whether the subject is clearly expressed in the title, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the act." Ritchie v.
People, 155 Ill., 98, 120, 4o N. E., 454, 463, 46 Am. St. Rep., 315,
29

L. R. A., 79.

In re Kol., 88 N. D. N. W., 273, the rule is stated to the same
effect, and is as follows:
"The Constitution only requires that the act shall contain
a single or object of legislation, and that such subject or object
shall be expressed in the title. It is not intended, neither is it
required, that the separate means or instrumentalities necessary to
accomplish the object of legislation shall be embodied in separate
acts. Such a requirement would be absurd, rendering legislative
acts fragmentary, and they would often fail of their intended
effect, from the inherent difficulty of expressing the legislative
will when restricted to such narrow bounds." The section of the
Constitution under consideration is found in the Constitution of
a majority of the States, and it is universally held, and we think
necessarily, that an act which has but a single purpose, and that
purpose is expressed in its title, may embrace all matters which
are naturally and reasonably in it, and all measures which will or
may facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose of the legislation. Such has been the uniform interpretation given by this
Court. State v. Woodmansee, i N. D., 246, 46 N. W., 970; Ii
R. A., 420; State v. Hass, 2 N. D., 202, 50 N. W., 254; State v.
Nomland, 3 N. D., 427, 57 N. W., 85, Am. St. Rep., 572; Richard
v. Stark Co., 8 N. D., 392, 79 N. W., 863; Power v. Kitching, io
N. D., 86 N. W., 737; Divet v. Richland Co., 8 N. D., 65, 76 N. W.,
993; Paine v. Dickey Co., 8 N. D., 581, 8o N. W., 770."
We have been able to find no, case which support the Court's
opinion under discussion. The opinion seems to us revolutionary and
unsound, and in violation of all the law on the subject, whether in or
out of our own state.

